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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Ancillary Jurisdiction-The Third-Party ]Defendant's
Claim Under Federal Rule 14 (a)
"[A]ncillary jurisdiction-the child of necessity and sire of confu-
sion"1 will now support an impleaded third-party defendant's claim against
the original plaintiff without requiring an independent jurisdictional basis.
In Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,2 the
original defendant, surety on a performance contract, impleaded the con-
tractor under Federal Rule 14(a).' The contractor in turn asserted a
14(a) claim against the plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff was responsible
for the contractor's failure to complete construction on time. Since both
the third-party defendant and original plaintiff were Maryland corpora-
tions, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the impleaded party's claim for lack
of diversity of citizenship. The motion to dismiss was denied on the
ground that the third party's claim was considered ancillary to the
plaintiff's original claim. The ruling on the motion was certified for im-
mediate appeal,4 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the first
appellate court to review the jurisdictional requirements for the impleaded
third party's claim, held that no independent jurisdictional basis was re-
quired.'
Federal courts may resolve those claims over which they have no
subject-matter jurisdiction by invoking the concept of ancillary juris-
diction. The theory is that "a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case
' Note, Federal Practice: Jurisdiction of Third-Party Claims, 11 OKLA. L. Rnv.
326, 329 (1958).
'426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) in pertinent part states:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or
part of the plaintiff's claim against him .... The person served with the
summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party de-
fendant ... may ... assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff,
and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses. ...
'28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
426 F.2d at 717.
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or controversy as an entirety."' 6 In the settlement of the principal con-
troversy, claims may arise, which if sued upon alone, could not be
presented in the federal court for failure to meet the subject-matter juris-
dictional requirements. However, because the district court has juris-
diction over the principal claim, it may resolve those incidental matters
that are part of the entire controversy.
7
Initially the ancillary concept developed in response to necessity.8
However, necessity could hardly justify the doctrine as it exists today,
and the potential importance of the ancillary concept was not fully realized
until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with their liberal
joinder provisions.9 As the federal rules were applied, it became obvious
that the purpose of the liberal joinder provisions would be partially de-
feated if the courts would not give an expansive interpretation to the
ancillary jurisdiction concept.10 In fact, the purposes behind the joinder
provisions and the ancillary doctrine are indeed similar. Of prime con-
sideration are the factors of avoiding untimely delays in the settlement of
controversies, keeping the expense of litigation to a minimum, and in-
creasing convenience to parties and witnesses to the dispute. Then too
the avoiding of piecemeal litigation and the precluding of incongruous
results on basically the same factual situations are desired objectives. On
the other hand, Congress has clearly defined the jurisdiction of the
federal courts," and the purpose of the federal rules is certainly not to
extend this jurisdiction. 12 Undoubtedly, every time the ancillary doctrine
is applied, these congressional grants of authority are violated.
But is procedural convenience sufficient justification for the avoidance
of these grants of jurisdiction?" Apparently so, for the majority of courts
have held that the doctrine will support the compulsory counterclaim, 4
' C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT].
SId.
For example, if property was in the custody of the federal court, any person
having an interest in that property could assert his claim in that court without meet-
ing any jurisdictional requirements. To hold otherwise would have been to deny
those persons any forum, for the state court had no jurisdiction over property with-
in the custody of the federal system. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450,
460 (1860).
9 E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 18, 20.
oWRIGHT § 76, at 336.
"E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1964).
FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
I See WRIGHT § 9, at 20.
"E.g., United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prod., Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d
Cir. 1955); Mayer v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 165 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
[Vol. 49
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the compulsory cross claim,' 5 the interpleader action,1 and the inter-
vention as of right.17 On the other hand, ancillary jurisdiction will not
support the permissive counterclaim,'" the permissive joinder of claims' 9
unless they are considered pendent,20 or permissive intervention.2' From
this empirical cross-section, it would appear that ancillary jurisdiction is
expanding to support any permissive claim so long as that claim is not
asserted by the original plaintiff in the action, and so long as the claim
arises from the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the original claim.22
If the concept of ancillary jurisdiction is expanding to support any
permissive claim arising out of the same transaction, it certainly has its
place under the third-party practice of rule 14(a). The concept was first
applied when the federal courts unanimously held that ancillary jurisdiction
would support the claim asserted against the impleaded third-party.2" The
theory used to justify this result is that "claim" as used by the federal
rules is broader in scope than the older legal phrase "cause of action"
"
8E.g., Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery, 180 F.2d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1950);
Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 228-29 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
"8 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) ; Haynes
v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 872-74 (5th Cir. 1957).
"E.g., Black v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 326 F.2d 603, 604 (10th Cir. 1964);
Fomulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 945 (1963).
8 Measurements Corp. v. Ferris Inst. Corp., 159 F.2d 590, 594 (3d Cir. 1947);
Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 226 (N.D. Iowa 1952).
" E.g., Delman v. Federal Prod. Corp., 251 F.2d 123, 126 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Wein-
traub v. Fitzgerald Bros. Brewing Co., 40 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
"'UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966) ; Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238,
246 (1933).
"E.g., Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, 212 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Olivieri v.
Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
2 That the claim must arise from the same transaction or occurrence has caused
considerable trouble. Initially claims were considered as coming from the same
transaction if they bore some logical relationship to one another. Moore v. New
York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). This relationship was said to exist
if "separate trials on each [claim] . . .would involve a substantial duplication of
effort and time by the parties and the courts." Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v.
Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961). The court in Revere
redefined this logical relationship by requiring either that the same set of operative
facts be the basis for both claims, or that the facts giving rise to the original claim
activate certain rights in the defendant that would have remained dormant. This
redefinition was certainly gratuitous for the claim being asserted in Revere would
have met even the initial test as one arising out of the same transaction. How-
ever, this new definition might be of some importance in considering the application
of ancillary jurisdiction to future claims.
"E.g., Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1965); Huggins v.
Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1964). See WRIGHT § 76, at 336.
1971]
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and means the aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right en-
forceable in a court. 4 This claim gives rise to rights in the plaintiff against
the defendant and to rights in the defendant against third parties to the
action.25 The defendant's rights, therefore, against third parties are merely
a part of the aggregate of operative facts and thus should be considered
ancillary26
Once this third-party is impleaded, the original plaintiff may assert
any claim against him that arises "out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's [original] claim."127 But here
the courts have required an independent basis for federal jurisdiction"
reasoning that plaintiff could be manufacturing jurisdiction through
this third-party practice and through collusive joinder of parties could
circumvent "the diversity rule by use of a friendly original defendant. 112
This third-party also has a right under rule 14(a) to "assert any claim
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the plaintiff's [original] claim .... ."0 The juris-
dictional requirement for this particular claim was the problem before the
court in Revere. A conflict had developed at the district court level with
at least two cases supporting Professor Moore's proposition that an in-
dependent jurisdictional ground to support the impleaded party's claim
against the plaintiff was required.31 The language of rule 14(a) giving
"Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 189 (2d Cir.
1943); IA W. BARRoN & A. HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 424,
at 653 (1960) [hereinafter cited as BARRoN & HOLTZOFF].
25 id.
"8 Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959), in which the court stated:
The great weight of authority amongst the federal district courts is to the
effect that when federal jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the main
action once attaches the court has ancillary jurisdiction to decide a third-
party dispute growing out of the same core of facts and hence within the
scope of the Rule even though the dispute, separately considered, is lacking
in the attributes of federal jurisdiction.
"'FEa. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
8 E.g., Friend v. Middle Atl. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 865 (1946); Corbi v. United States, 298 F. Supp. 521, 522 (W.D.
Pa. 1969) ; WRIGHT § 76, at 337.2 Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 39 F. Supp. 305, 306 (E.D.N.Y.
1941) ; 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE 14.27[1] (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as MooRE].
"FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
"Compare James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America, 178 F.
Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) and Shverha v. Maryland Cas. Co., 110 F. Supp. 173
(E.D. Pa. 1953) with Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
38 F.R.D. 486 (D. Neb. 1965) and Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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rise to the third-party defendant's claim is substantially identical to that
describing plaintiff's assertion of a claim against the impleaded party,32
and Professor Moore reasons that because an independent jurisdictional
ground to support the plaintiff's claim is required, so too should there be
a requirement of this same independent jurisdictional basis to support the
impleaded party's claim against the plaintiff.33 In conjunction with Pro-
fessor Moore's argument is rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which states that "[t] hese rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts . .. .- '
Such an interpretation, however, tends to be rather restrictive in light
of the policy behind the federal rules of settling as much in a single con-
troversy as is possible. As could be expected, therefore, a line of cases
began to develop at the district court level that did not require this
independent jurisdictional ground for the third-party claim against original
plaintiffs.35 These district courts chose to disregard the language upon
which Professor Moore relies. Rather the courts focused attention on the
reasons supporting different jurisdictional requirements for these ap-
parently identical claims.
To effectuate the purpose of rule 14(a), it would appear that a
reason must exist for not allowing ancillary jurisdiction to support the
claim. Regarding the original plaintiff's claim against the impleaded
third-party this reason is apparent; there exists the possible threat that
a plaintiff could manufacture jurisdiction through the use of a friendly
defendant.3" If no independent jurisdictional ground were required
for plaintiff's assertion of a claim against the third-party, circumvention
of jurisdictional requirements through abuse of rule 14(a) would be the
result, and the plaintiff would be able to invoke jurisdiction indirectly
when he could not have done so directly.37 On the other hand this same
threat of collusion does not exist in the claim asserted by the impleaded
82 See text accompanying notes 27 & 30 supra.
3 MooRE 14.27[2].
3 4 FED. R. Civ. P. 82. See James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of
N. America, 178 F. Supp. 146, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
" Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486
(D. Neb. 1965); Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30
F.R.D. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Bernstein v. N.V. Nederland-scheamerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 9 F.R.D. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
" See, e.g., authorities cited note 29 supra.
" Note, Federal Third-Party Practice-Ancillary Jurisdiction Supports Third-
Party Defendant's Claim Against Plaintiff, 8 UTAH L. REv. 145, 148 (1962). But
see Frazer, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts,
33 F.R.D. 27, 42 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Frazer]
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party, for the parties asserting these claims enter the lawsuit in different
postures. The plaintiff, in bringing the action submits "himself to all
claims arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the
litigation,"38 while "[t]he third-party defendant, on the other hand, is
before the court involuntarily, and in all fairness he ought to be able to
assert all claims arising out of the subject matter of the original action
which he may have against the plaintiff."' 9 Therefore, the policy considera-
tions supporting ancillary jurisdiction call for its application to support
the claim of the impleaded third-party against the plaintiff. Sufficient
differences exist between these claims and plaintiff's claims against the
third-party defendant to warrant different jurisdictional requirements.
Therefore, in Revere the court's extension of ancillary jurisdiction
was absolutely correct, but several problems are inherent in the decision
that need consideration. The first problem is how the plaintiff's response
to the impleaded party's claim is to be categorized. Logically the response
should be treated as a compulsory counterclaim under rule 13(a)40
which, according to a majority of courts, would be supported by ancillary
jurisdiction.41 But here again the plaintiff will have succeeded in manu-
facturing his jurisdiction. A second inevitable problem is whether the
threat of the collusive manufacturing of jurisdiction is so predominant as
to require the avoidance of all other policy considerations supporting rule
14(a).42 A pretrial agreement between the plaintiff and defendant to
implead a third party is undoubtedly remote,4" and such collusive align-
ment of parties to affect federal jurisdiction could be easily detected at the
8 Note, 11 OKLA. L. REv., supra note 1, at 328.
I' d.
'
0 FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
,
1E.g., Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634
(3d Cir. 1961) ; United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prod., Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216
(2d Cir. 1955); 1A BARRON & HOLTZoFF § 392, at 548.
" Frazer at 42-43, where the author argues for an extension of ancillary juris-
diction to support plaintiff's claim against an impleaded party and concludes:
Once a third-party defendant is brought into an action the court should be
able to settle all claims arising out of the transaction that is the basis of the
action, and it should be immaterial which party asserts the claim because
the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation of disputes is as great whether
the claim is asserted by a defendant or by a plaintiff. The parties and the
facts are already before the court so that the burden on the court will not
be increased by holding that the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
defendant is ancillary.
, "That there may be collusion between the original parties in some cases
should not prevent plaintiffs from asserting claims against third-party defendants
in all cases. The courts should only dismiss the claim when collusion actually
exists." Id. at 42.
[Vol. 49
RIGHT TO RETAIN ARREST RECORDS
initial stages of trial.44 However, because of over-emphasis ol the threat
of jurisdictional collusion, precedent has developed requiring an in-
dependent jurisdictional ground.45 Therefore, the extension of ancillary
jurisdiction to cover the original plaintiff's claim against the impleaded
party is less certain but arguably necessary if effect is to be given the
policy behind the federal rules and if the courts are going to perform
their primary function of settling the entire dispute.
E. L. KITTRELL SMITH
Constitutional Law-Right of Police to Retain Arrest Records
The advent of the computer, proposals for a new National Data Bank,1
development of means for rapid and efficient interchange of information,
and highly publicized incidents of police and military surveillance have
crystallized public concern over the information retention activities of
government agencies. This developing wariness of records would seem
to germinate from their accelerated capacity for harm. At present, masses
of records may be conveniently stored in computers subject to almost
instantaneous recall. The data retained by one organization may be
expeditiously conveyed to another on request.' The total effect of these
technological advances is an increased potentiality for evil as well as good.
The accuracy and validity of records that are damaging in nature must,
therefore, be laboriously scrutinized if the interests of individuals are not
to be crushed by a newly mechanized bureaucracy.
A recent federal case, Menard v. Mitchell,3 outlined many of the
competing considerations involved in the right of the police to keep records
of arrests. The plaintiff brought an action seeking to compel the Attorney
General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Invest.gation to ex-
" At least another potential problem area has been avoided where the main
claim is dismissed leaving only the third-party defendant's claim which lacks an
independent jurisdictional base, for "[j]urisdiction once acquired is not lost by
changes in the situation leaving only ancillary matters for determination." 1A
BAR ON & HOLTZOFF § 424, at 658.
'" See note 29 supra.
'For an analysis of the advisability of a National Data Bank see generally J.
ROSENBERG, THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ROSENBERG].
Id. 64-68.
'430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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